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Introduction 
This essay will primarily focus on the 2016 US election, including its ideological, socio-
economic and political circumstances. Evidently, this context relates to numerous ‘politi-
cal disconnects,’ phenomena which are all too obvious in contemporary American cul-
ture and society. In this respect, the narrow victory of a TV celebrity, businessman, and 
right-wing nationalist, who now serves as the 45th President of the United States, can be 
seen as an apt expression of the ideological divisions by which American culture and 
politics have been marked for quite some time.1 Perhaps, then, liberal commentators 
and intellectuals should not have been all that surprised about the election’s outcome. 
For although former President Barack Obama was successful in getting reelected in 
2012, his eight years in office also saw the rise of the Tea Party movement and a Repub-
lican Party which has increasingly drifted to the right. While this essay is certainly con-
cerned with such political divisions – divisions, that is, which separate ‘blue states’ from 
‘red states,’ Democrats from Republicans, liberals from conservatives, and the so-called 
left from the new right – I prefer to concentrate on a different (but perhaps equally chal-
lenging) type of disconnect. What I mean is the disconnect between today’s left (or, more 
precisely, what I have termed the ‘cultural left’) and large segments of the American 
working and lower middle class. Here, regarding the 2016 election, I will analyze the 
Clinton campaign’s curious inability to effectively articulate issues like class injustice 
and socioeconomic inequality. While this may seem to be mostly an ‘American’ issue, I 
am convinced that the class problem and the question of inequality go well beyond the 
US context and are in many ways related to the general upsurge of the new right, a phe-
nomenon which can be observed in numerous European countries as well. 
Overall, the essay consists of two parts. In the first part, I attempt to situate the 
Trump victory and the recent upsurge of right-wing populism against the backdrop of 
                                                        
1 While these divisions are nowadays oftentimes related to an ideological struggle between nationalism 
and so-called ‘globalism,’ another point of reference would be the ongoing ‘Culture Wars,’ a term that has 
been in use since the early 1990s (cf. Hunter 1991).  
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neoliberalism and its current crisis. In the second part, I will then investigate the ways in 
which the left has played a part in this development. As mentioned above, I use the term 
‘cultural left’ here, hoping that this will underline the affinities between many positions 
currently held by the mainstream left, especially in the US, and the legacy of Cultural 
Studies. To put it in a nutshell, my claim is that today’s left, which is generally more fo-
cused on identity issues than on class matters and economic policy, seems curiously ill-
equipped to counter the recent rise of right-wing populism.2 In a sense, then, this second 
part of the essay may appear like a type of self-criticism – something which was relative-
ly common right after the election, when all kinds of intellectuals and activists asked 
themselves how the left may have contributed to the election’s outcome.3 While I am 
certain that some readers may by now be tired of such routinized forms of self-critique 
or ‘soul-searching,’ I see a greater danger in that – due to the expectedly disastrous start 
of the Trump presidency as well as the debate about Russian meddling in the election – 
the necessary discussion on the failure of the left may come to an end before it really 
started. This discussion, however, is highly important. For if phenomena such as the 
Brexit in the UK, the election of Trump in the US, and the overall rise of right-wing popu-
lism in Europe (and basically across the globe) would not be considered a wake-up-call 
for the left – then what else would have to happen to have this effect? 
 
Neoliberalism and the 2016 US Election 
In what follows, I seek to situate the Trump victory and the recent success of the new 
right in the context of neoliberalism, and more specifically, in what I refer to as the ‘crisis 
of neoliberalism.’ This reference is certainly not supposed to suggest that neoliberalism 
as a set of economic policies is dead, or that it has been superseded by a new accumula-
tion regime or a new mode of regulation.4 Nevertheless, as William Davies has recently 
put it: “The question inevitably arises, is this thing called ‘neoliberalism’ now over? And 
if not, when might it be and how would we know?” (2017: xviii). Indeed, there are a 
number of theorists who claim that the financial-economic crisis of 2008 and its unre-
solved causes will eventually prove to be so severe and all-encompassing that what re-
sults will either be “the breakdown of the capitalist system” (Wallerstein/Collins/Mann 
                                                        
2 On the general turn from class analysis to identity politics, cf. Michaels 2006. Regarding the upsurge of 
right-wing populism, cf. Klein 2017: 127: “The crucial lesson of Brexit and of Trump’s victory is that lead-
ers who are seen as representing the failed neoliberal status quo are no match for the demagogues and 
neo-fascists. Only a bold and genuinely redistributive progressive agenda can offer real answers to ine-
quality and the crises in democracy.” 
3 Cf., for instance, the reactions from American intellectuals such as Judith Butler and Stephen Greenblatt 
which appeared in the German Süddeutsche Zeitung immediately after the election (Baker/Boyle/Butler et 
al. 2016). 
4 These terms are central concepts in the Regulation School’s approach to capitalism (cf. Aglietta 1979). 
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et al. 2013: 2) or a significant structural change and readjustment.5 While it seems pre-
mature to make any such predictions, I will argue that there exists a notable ideological 
crisis of neoliberalism, as the neoliberal doctrine is currently challenged by voices from 
both the left and the right. 
So in which way can this crisis of neoliberalism be said to have impacted the elec-
tion? A simple answer is that the disaffections caused by neoliberalism, globalization, 
and economic policies that led to a continuous increase in the unequal distribution of 
wealth added to the popularity of two of the candidates in particular, who, in their very 
different ways, both seemed to represent an alternative. These candidates are Bernie 
Sanders for the Democrats (whose loss to Hillary Clinton in the primaries was much 
tighter than almost anyone had expected) and Donald Trump for the Republicans 
(whose election as President was even more surprising). While Sanders embodied a 
‘left-wing’ solution to the crisis of capitalism, one that is based on social democracy and 
the idea of a strong welfare state, Trump represented a ‘right-wing’ solution, one that 
embraces a nationalist doctrine of isolationist protectionism, for which he campaigned 
under the slogan ‘America first.’ 6 
Now, it certainly seems rather odd to see in Trump a critic of neoliberalism, or, for 
that matter, a champion of the working class. After all, Trump is a billionaire, who has 
consistently avoided paying taxes, and who has a record of exploiting the people that 
work for him. He campaigned under the neoliberal motto that he would run America 
‘like a business,’ while frequently referring to Ronald Reagan, who embodies the rise of 
neoliberalism in the 1980s, as one of his role models. Moreover, with his tax policy, his 
planned healthcare reform, as well as by appointing representatives of Goldman Sachs, 
Exxon Mobile, and other multinational companies to his cabinet, it is likely that many 
aspects of his economic policies will represent a mere continuation, if not an intensifica-
tion, of his predecessors’ neoliberal programs.7 
                                                        
5 Cf., for instance, Duménil/Lévy 2011, Wallerstein/Collins/Mann et al. 2013, Mason 2015, and Streeck 
2016. Other authors, however, have underlined the persistence of neoliberalism, which has managed to 
survive the financial crisis and its aftermath (cf. Crouch 2011 and Mirowski 2013). 
6 As a response to “the widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic 
system, but also that it is now impossible even to imagine a coherent alternative to it,” Mark Fisher has 
introduced the concept of ‘Capitalist Realism’ (2009: 2). While it would be an exaggeration to suggest that 
Sanders and Trump represent a break with this doctrine (as their models of politics remain firmly an-
chored in the capitalist logic), what they articulated in their campaigns was an alternative to the currently 
dominant type of capitalism as based on neoliberal principles and an affirmation of the global market. 
7 It has oftentimes been claimed that there is a tension in the general direction of the Trump Administra-
tion’s economic policy, which is influenced by both the economic nationalism of former White House Chief 
Strategist Steve Bannon and the more transnational orientation of Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner. 
However, as Naomi Klein has argued, “when it comes to deconstructing the state, and outsourcing as much 
as possible to for-profit corporations, Bannon and Kushner are not in conflict but in perfect alignment” 
(2017: 3f). 
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Nevertheless, there are aspects of his ideology – and more importantly, of his rheto-
ric – that significantly contradict the capitalist free market ideology, something which 
enabled him to connect with voters from the working class during the campaign. Most 
notably, Trump called for higher tariffs on imports and spoke out against NAFTA as well 
as other free trade agreements, arguing that they result in a massive outsourcing of 
American jobs to foreign countries.8 Along these lines, the principal metaphor of his 
campaign became the giant wall he intends to build between the USA and Mexico, a plan 
which is supposedly designed to keep out illegal immigrants from entering the American 
job market. While it is unclear whether this plan will ever be fully implemented, the wall 
evidently also has a symbolic function in that it emblematically represents a decided 
opposition to the politics of open borders and global free trade. 
These elements of a populist economic nationalism, along with his straightforward 
language, his opposition to political correctness, and his anti-elitist and anti-corruption 
rhetoric – his alleged effort, that is, to ‘drain the swamp’9 – is part of the reason why 
Trump became popular among members of the working and lower middle class, and in 
particular the white working class in the so-called ‘rust belt’ area. Hillary Clinton, to the 
contrary, was perceived by many as the epitome of the liberal elite, the Wall Street can-
didate who is thoroughly out of touch with the problems and hardships of ‘common 
Americans.’ Although it is likely that Trump will eventually do even less to improve the 
economic situation of the working class than Clinton would have, it is nevertheless strik-
ing that she had such obvious problems connecting with working-class voters, many of 
whom had voted for the Democrats in previous elections. To be sure, there are also non-
economic factors that have contributed to Clinton’s defeat, and sexism has certainly 
played a role here. It would be too easy, however, to simply dismiss the class aspect of 
the election’s outcome and blame Trump’s victory exclusively on racism, misogyny, and 
prejudice. While all these factors obviously played a role, what I will argue is 1) that rac-
ism should not be viewed independently from questions of political economy, as if it was 
an entirely autonomous phenomenon. And 2) that the class dimension that came to the 
                                                        
8 Having initially planned to completely withdraw from NAFTA, Trump later announced that the agree-
ment will be renegotiated (cf. Davis 2017). 
9 It seems hardly worth mentioning that Trump has not only fallen short of this particular campaign prom-
ise, but that the make-up of his cabinet – apparently the wealthiest one in modern American history – 
renders all such announcements utterly ridiculous. Cf., for instance, Klein 2017: 21: “Trump and his cabi-
net of former executives are remaking government at a startling pace to serve the interests of their own 
businesses, their former businesses, and their tax bracket as a whole. Within hours of taking office, Trump 
called for a massive tax cut, which would see corporations pay just 15 percent (down from 35 percent), 
and pledged to slash regulations by 75 percent. His tax plan includes a range of other breaks and loop-
holes for very wealthy people like the ones inhabiting his cabinet (not to mention himself). He appointed 
his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, to head up a ‘swat team’ stacked with corporate executives who have been 
tasked with finding new regulations to eliminate, new programs to privatize, and new ways to make the 
US government ‘run like a great American company’. (According to an analysis by Public Citizen, Trump 
met with at least 190 corporate executives in less than three months in office – before announcing that 
visitor logs would no longer be made public).” 
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fore in the election goes well beyond this isolated example, but points to the fact that, in 
the last few decades, the left has become increasingly unable to effectively address is-
sues like class injustice and economic inequality. 
In order to connect these issues to the outcome of the election, it is worthwhile to 
first look at the election’s demographic data. Here, it is important to note that Clinton 
won the popular vote by almost three million votes (cf. CNN Politics 2017), a fact that 
significantly relativizes the sense that there has been a Republican landslide victory, a 
major swing to the right, or, as some people have called it, a ‘whitelash’ (cf. Blake 2016). 
Indeed, according to the exit polls, whites are ironically the only ethnic group from 
which the Republicans received a smaller percentage of votes than in 2012 – namely 58 
instead of 59 percent – while Trump gained among black, Latino, and Asian voters when 
compared to Romney’s performance four years earlier (cf. Fig. 1 and 2). Regarding low-
income groups – that is, people who earn less than 50,000 or 30,000 dollars annually – 
Clinton still has a lead over Trump, but it is among these constituencies that Republicans 
were most successful in gaining new voters since 2012, while Democrats faced the big-
gest losses (cf. Fig. 3 and 4). Obviously, this trend should not only be of concern to the 
Democratic Party, but to the left in general. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Exit polls of the 2016 Presidential election (race). On the left are the percentage points for the Demo-
cratic candidate (Hillary Clinton), on the right for the Republican candidate (Donald Trump). 
 
 
Fig. 2: Exit polls of the 2012 Presidential election (race). On the left are the percentage points for the Demo-
cratic candidate (Barack Obama), on the right for the Republican candidate (Mitt Romney). 
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Fig. 3: Exit polls of the 2016 Presidential election (income). On the left are the percentage points for the Dem-
ocratic candidate (Hillary Clinton), on the right for the Republican candidate (Donald Trump). 
 
 
Fig. 4: Exit polls of the 2012 Presidential election (income). On the left are the percentage points for the Dem-
ocratic candidate (Barack Obama), on the right for the Republican candidate (Mitt Romney). 
 
Although this does not mean that class analysis alone could explain the rise of right-wing 
populism, one can safely assume that class-related issues have played a decisive role in 
the 2016 election. It is therefore no coincidence that the states which the Democrats lost 
in comparison to 2012 are states with a large white working-class population – people, 
that is, in Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Pennsylvania, who oftentimes had for-
merly voted for the Democrats, but who felt that Clinton offered no alternative (cf. Fig. 
5).10 Considering that many of these people voted for Obama in the previous elections, it 
would be too simple to refer to Trump’s racism as their chief motivation.11 Instead, as 
Michael Moore has put it, voters from the rust belt area, who felt “forgotten,” “beaten 
down,” and “dispossessed,” saw in Trump “the human Molotov Cocktail that they’ve 
been waiting for. The human hand grenade that they can legally throw into the system 
that stole their lives from them” (cf. Michael Moore in TrumpLand).12 
                                                        
10 Besides those rust belt states, the Democrats also lost Florida, which is traditionally a swing state. 
11 In favor of the argument that race played a pivotal role in the election’s outcome, a number of authors 
have rightly pointed out that whites of both sexes – and almost all ages, education levels, and income 
groups – predominantly voted for Trump (cf. Henley 2016). While this surely underlines the ongoing ra-
cial divisions in the US, the inclination to vote Republican among white voters is not a new phenomenon. 
As outlined above, the most characteristic fluctuation from the 2012 to the 2016 election concerns the 
drift of low-income voters from the Democrats to the Republicans. 
12 A very similar point can be made with regard to the Brexit referendum, in which members of the lower 
middle and working classes predominantly voted to leave the EU, while the upper classes tended to be in 
favor of remaining (cf. Harris 2016). 
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Fig. 5: Electoral map of the 2016 Presidential election. Democratic states are blue, Republican states are red. 
States that flipped to the Republicans are striped. 
 
Of course, this kind of analysis is likely to draw criticism from some on the left, who may 
object that a class-based interpretation of the Trump victory could eventually justify the 
election of a xenophobic nationalist and sexist bigot. It is not my intention, however, to 
legitimate the outcome of the election, but, rather, to make sense of it without reifying 
racism or sexism, that is, treating them as quasi ‘givens’ for which there is no need of any 
further explanation. Indeed, to point out the economic conditions and implications of the 
recent drift to the right is not at all a trivialization or meant to downplay the dangers 
and consequences of this development. On the contrary, if we follow Polanyi, for in-
stance, who analyzed the social effects of laissez-faire capitalism, then we should right-
fully be alarmed that our current situation somewhat resembles the situation of Po-
lanyi’s time, which saw the rise of fascism. As Polanyi argues in The Great Transfor-
mation, there is not just a left-wing solution to the problems and contradictions created 
by capitalism, there is also a ‘fascist solution’ – and he interprets the rise of fascism pre-
cisely as a response to “the condition of the market system” (2001: 250).13 Hence, alt-
                                                        
13 Cf. also Polanyi 2001: 32: “Market society was born in England – yet it was on the Continent that its 
weaknesses engendered the most tragic complications. In order to comprehend German fascism, we must 
revert to Ricardian England.” 
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hough there are certainly significant differences between fascism and the discourse of 
the new right, it may nevertheless be worthwhile to reread Polanyi in view of the cur-
rent situation.14 
 
From Class to Identity: Cultural Studies and the Contemporary Left 
What I seek to demonstrate now is that the left’s current problem in attracting voters 
and supporters from the working class has a history that resonates with the history of 
Cultural Studies, particularly in the US. Approximately since the 1980s, there occurred a 
major shift which largely transformed left-wing politics from a class-based movement 
critical of exploitation, economic inequality, and the general commodification of social 
life into a movement promoting a multiculturalist ‘politics of recognition’ (cf. Taylor 
1992) mainly based on identity issues and geared, for instance, to anti-racism, anti-
sexism, and anti-homophobia. Interestingly, these issues nowadays constitute the main-
stream of left-liberal discourse, so that even a centrist Democrat with neoliberal inclina-
tions, like Hillary Clinton, can easily promote a politics based on the mutual recognition 
of otherness and a celebration of diversity. It is probably due to its marginalization of 
class and its easy compatibility with neoliberalism – to whose transnational orientation 
it oftentimes serves as the fitting ideology – that identity politics and the ‘politics of 
recognition’ have come under critical scrutiny by parts of the left in recent years.15 Even 
an author like Didier Eribon, who is largely associated with identity-based gay rights 
activism, has claimed that today’s left has widely neglected ‘class oppression,’ a fact that 
he sees directly connected to the rise of right-wing movements such as the Front Na-
tional.16 
 Regarding the 2016 US election, however, it is of course noteworthy that Bernie 
Sanders, representing a rather marginal current in his party, did surely not neglect class 
                                                        
14 For an attempt to use Polanyi’s understanding of ‘the great transformation’ as a basis for analyzing ‘the 
great financialization’ of our time, cf. Levitt 2013. 
15 Cf., for instance, Michaels 2006 and Fraser/Honneth 2003. 
16 Cf. Eribon 2013: 241: “During the period of the 1960s and 1970s, when I was student and when Marx-
ism dominated French intellectual life […], all other forms of ‘struggle’ seemed ‘secondary’ – or they might 
even be denounced as ‘petite bourgeois distractions’ from the place where attention should be focused, 
the only ‘true’ struggle, […] that of the working class. Movements that came to be labeled as ‘cultural’ were 
focusing their attention on various dimensions that Marxism had set aside: gendered, sexual, and racial 
forms of subjectivation, among others. Because Marxism’s attention was so exclusively concentrated on 
class oppression, these other movements were required to find other avenues for problematizing lived 
experience, and they often ended up to a great extent neglecting class oppression.” As Eribon further ar-
gues, when the left lost interest in the problem of class exploitation in the 1980s, working-class voters 
increasingly drifted to the extreme right: “I am convinced that voting for the National Front must be inter-
preted, at least in part, as the final recourse of people of the working classes attempting to defend their 
collective identity, or to defend, in any case, a dignity that was being trampled on – now even by those who 
had once been their representatives and defenders” (2013: 132). 
  
 
Coils of the Serpent 2 (2018): 20-34 
 
28 Schleusener: Political Disconnects 
issues. Not too surprising, though, Sanders was frequently criticized by the liberal estab-
lishment and various parts of the left. As Slavoj Žižek writes, this was partly due to “his 
close contact with small farmers and other working people […], the typical electoral 
supporters of Republican conservatives. Sanders is ready to listen to their worries and 
cares, rather than dismissing them as white racist trash” (2016: 63). In Kill All Normies, 
her book on the “online culture wars,” Angela Nagle makes a similar point:  
While the alt-right regard [liberal websites like Buzzfeed] and the Guardian, BBC 
and CNN as the media of ‘the left’, espousing ‘Cultural Marxism’, it became obvious 
when the possibility of any kind of economically ‘left’ political force emerged that 
liberal media sources were often the most vicious and oppositional. Liberal femi-
nist journalist Joan Walsh called Bernie Sanders’s supporters ‘Berniebot keyboard 
warriors’, while Salon was one of the main propagators of the Berniebro meme 
with headlines like, ‘Bernie Bros out of control: Explosion of misogynist rage…’ 
and, ‘Just like a Bernie Bro, Sanders bullies Clinton…’ (2017: 43) 
As Nagle argues, however, allegations of the Sanders campaign’s ‘sexism’ were hardly 
based on facts, but rather served as a pretext to attack the campaign’s focus on class 
matters rather than identity issues: 
Despite overwhelming evidence of Bernie’s popularity among young women, the 
myth was relentlessly peddled until it passed into the realm of Internet truth. The 
old liberal establishment then weighed in; for example, when feminist Gloria Stei-
nem claimed that these numerous female Bernie fans were merely trying to im-
press their male peers. (2017: 44) 
But what, now, has all this to do with Cultural Studies? Significantly in this respect, in the 
early phase of Cultural Studies the areas of culture and the economy were still thought of 
as essentially interrelated and depending on each other. Cultural Studies were certainly 
concerned with dismantling the base/superstructure dualism of classical Marxism, so as 
to render culture not simply the reflection of a society’s economic structure (cf. Williams 
1977: 11-20, 75-82). Nevertheless, Raymond Williams and the Birmingham School, 
among others, were still in many ways preoccupied with analyzing the interdependen-
cies between culture and the economy, or, more specifically, “the indissoluble connec-
tions between material production, political and cultural institutions and activity, and 
consciousness” (1977: 80). Along these lines, early Cultural Studies oftentimes referred 
to Gramsci, who, on the one hand, sought to move the realm of culture out of the shadow 
of Marxist economism, while, on the other hand, making clear that culture and the econ-
omy are fundamentally interconnected. In his texts on Fordism, for example, Gramsci 
argued that the prohibition and the mobilization of a ‘puritanical’ cultural tradition in 
1920s America was predominantly meant to aid the enforcement of the rationalist sys-
tem of Fordist production.17 For Gramsci, then, cultural forms and manifestations (such 
                                                        
17 Cf. Gramsci 1971: 303: “‘Puritanical’ initiatives simply have the purpose of preserving, outside of work, 
a certain psycho-physical equilibrium which prevents the physiological collapse of the worker, exhausted 
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as abstinence or monogamy) are not independent from the respective relations of pro-
duction, an insight which led early proponents of Cultural Studies to regard the realm of 
culture as partly constitutive for the implementation of a particular economic order. 
This kind of linkage, however, has more and more disappeared from view in the field’s 
later development, especially since the late 1980s and early 1990s. A fitting example to 
illustrate this development is the fact that the earlier term Race, Class, and Gender Stud-
ies (which at least suggested some kind of entanglement between cultural and economic 
factors) has become largely replaced by the narrower, more identity-oriented expres-
sion Race and Gender Studies.18 It seems, then, that a later generation of scholars effec-
tively uncoupled the conjunction between cultural identity and economic production. 
 This circumstance can be observed, for example, in Judith Butler’s extremely influ-
ential Gender Trouble from 1990 – the year which marks the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and therefore the final triumph of global capitalism.19 In this context, what is significant 
about the book is how it entirely detaches the problem of a normative gender identity 
from all questions regarding modes of production or the division of labor. Instead, But-
ler connects the compulsory order of gender and sexuality to the so-called “heterosexual 
matrix,” a term by which she designates the discursive “grid of cultural intelligibility 
through which bodies, genders, and desires are naturalized” (2007: 208). It can be ar-
gued, then, that while early Cultural Studies were still grappling with the base/super-
structure dualism, the whole idea of an immanent relation between cultural manifesta-
tions and economic realities was in later years almost completely abandoned, resulting 
in a conception in which the things that matter most are seemingly non-material entities 
like culture, identity, narrative, and discourse. Consequently, this trend has not only 
played a significant role in the marginalization of class (which was typically either over-
looked or reconfigured as a form of identity20), but also signals a major epistemological 
                                                                                                                                                                             
by the new method of production […]. American industrialists are concerned to maintain the continuity of 
the physical and muscular-nervous efficiency of the worker. It is in their interests to have a stable, skilled 
labour force, a permanently well-adjusted complex, because the human complex (the collective worker) of 
an enterprise is also a machine which cannot, without considerable loss, be taken to pieces too often and 
renewed with single new parts.” 
18 As Walter Benn Michaels argues, “class has always seemed a little like the odd man out in the race/gen-
der/class trinity” (2006: 200). Rather than representing a simple continuity, however, the relative neglect 
of class issues in the humanities is related to a trend that became especially noticeable in the late 1980s 
and 1990s. For the field of American Studies, cf., for instance, Lemke 2014: 41: “In the early nineties the 
New American Studies drew our attention to sexist, imperialist, racist and homophobic practices and rep-
resentations. In the late nineties we embraced transnational, global, postcolonial, and ecological per-
spectives. Again, if at all, class matters were mostly limited to research on naturalism and the Great De-
pression.” 
19 Besides the book’s high degree of publicity, I am not singling out Gender Trouble for any specific reason 
here. Obviously, the tendency that interests me can be traced in a wide range of publications from that 
period, in Cultural Studies and beyond. 
20 An example of this tendency is the fact that it has become common in Cultural Studies lingo to use terms 
like classism or povertyism, thereby treating class as if it was simply another identity category. The prob-
lem here is that class fundamentally differs from identity in that to be poor is a problem in itself, while 
there certainly is nothing inherently wrong with being black or a woman. When using a term like ‘poverty-
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and ontological shift. In other words, the humanities’ relative neglect of class issues and 
economic inequality is coupled with the theoretical sidelining of ‘materiality’ as a whole, 
which, during the heyday of postmodernism, poststructuralism, and Cultural Theory, 
was largely excluded from critical analysis.21 And this tendency – in conjunction with the 
valorization of culture and discourse as the ultimate forms of social reality – is surely 
among the factors that have contributed to the reification of concepts like racism or sex-
ism. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I would like to quickly relate the above presented analysis to the 2016 
election. While it is certainly important to differentiate between academic discourse and 
political discourse, it is nevertheless evident that there exists a contact zone in which 
arguments, ideas, and slogans are picked up, transmitted, and appropriated, traveling 
from one field to the other. In the case of the Democrats, it seems obvious that the move 
from class to identity (which I have outlined in relation to the history of Cultural Stud-
ies) has clearly left its mark on the party’s general political orientation, which – despite 
the popularity of Bernie Sanders – is still to a large degree influenced by identity politics 
and the politics of recognition. This has become especially evident in one of the more 
memorable moments of Hillary Clinton’s election campaign. At a fundraiser in Septem-
ber 2016, Clinton claimed that about half of Trump’s supporters belong in what she 
termed a “basket of deplorables,” adding that they are “racist, sexist, homophobic, xeno-
phobic, Islamophobic – you name it.” Some of these people, she argued, “are irredeema-
ble, but thankfully they are not America” (cf. Mehta 2016).22 Apparently, what Clinton 
wanted to achieve with this statement was to forcefully counter Trump’s xenophobic 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ism,’ however – in analogy to terms like racism or sexism – one implicitly makes the claim that what the 
poor need is not to get rid of poverty, but rather of the disrespect they may experience for being poor (cf. 
Lister 2017). Yet, different from the case of identity categories such as race and gender, the solution to the 
problem of poverty is not respect or ‘recognition,’ but would involve an actual ‘redistribution’ of wealth 
(Fraser 1995). For more on this, cf. Michaels 2006: 106: “Classism is what you’re a victim of not because 
you’re poor but because people aren’t nice to you because you’re poor.” Such a concept “treats economic 
difference along the lines of racial and sexual difference, thus identifying the problem not as the difference 
but as the prejudice (racism, sexism) against the difference.” 
21 In recent years, the widespread ennui with this development has inspired the resurgence of various new 
types of realism and materialism that are firmly opposed to the marginalization of materiality, criticizing 
the implied ‘correlationism’ of postmodern theory and social-linguistic constructivism (cf., for instance, 
Meillassoux 2008, Coole/Frost [eds.] 2010, and Bryant/Srnicek/Harman [eds.] 2011). Yet, in terms of 
politics (especially when it comes to contemporary capitalism), the works of this ‘new materialism’ have 
thus far been largely disappointing. Although much more needs to be said about this, the essay at hand is 
not the right place for that discussion. Cf., however, Paul Rekret’s (2016) compelling analysis, which fo-
cuses on the perspectives of Jane Bennett, Karen Barad, and Rosi Braidotti. 
22 An interesting aspect of Clinton’s statement is that it exemplifies the frivolous way in which the logic of 
American exceptionalism (cf. Madsen 1998 and Pease 2009) is nowadays oftentimes coupled with a ‘pro-
gressive’ multiculturalist agenda. 
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right-wing ideology. Her wording, however, was more than unfortunate, because, on the 
one hand, she offered Trump’s followers a perfect occasion to attack her in return for 
scapegoating a large part of the American population.23 On the other hand, her expres-
sion clearly resonates with what I have described as the reification of racism. If someone 
is a racist, the message seems to be, then there is nothing to be done, for such a person is 
likely to be “irredeemable.” In other words, racism does not need to be explained any-
more, since it has itself become an explanation, a seemingly transcendent cause and not 
an effect of something else. 
 As a last point, then, I would like to assert that for both Cultural Studies and today’s 
left it would indeed be worthwhile to take class matters, political economy, and the 
question of socioeconomic injustice more seriously again.24 This might at least serve as 
one possible strategy to confront the rise of right-wing populism (as well as the discon-
nect between the working class and the left) more effectively. Obviously, this proposi-
tion should neither be understood as a return to a simplistic model of ‘Marxist econo-
mism,’ nor as a nostalgic longing for the ‘Fordist consensus’ (Beck 2008: 76). Yet, when 
coming up with a political program, the left should ask itself whether its content and 
language would appeal to people from the lower economic classes as well. If the only 
message that, say, an unemployed white worker from the American Midwest will pick up 
from the left is that, due to his whiteness, he is nonetheless still privileged, then, per-
haps, one should not be all too surprised about the recent working-class drift to the 
right. 
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